

Downwind and Out: The Strategic Dispersion of Power Plants and Their Pollution

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Air-Quality Regulation

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The Clean Air Acts of 1963 and 1970 (and subsequent amendments):

- **Federal** agencies set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
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
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Problems:

1. Regulated units **strategically respond** to this regulatory patchwork.
2. Coal-generated air **pollution travels long distances**.

⇒ Attribution, regulation, & enforcement are complicated!

An example of transport's regulatory complexity: The Huntington-Ashland (WV-KY-OH) non-attainment area



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So what?


In this paper, we

- Highlight **regulatory challenges** in the current, federalist system.
- Identify **strategic responses** to regulatory oversight.
- Underscore the importance of **transport-focused regulation**.

An example of **the transport problem** for coal emissions

Plant 3470, January 2005


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Literature

In general, our work is related to three strands of literature:

[1] Strategy and the CAA

- Downwind siting for polluters as a strategy (*e.g.* Monogan III et al. (2017))
- Strategic abatement decisions (*e.g.* Zou, 2020)
- Strategic *monitor* placement (*e.g.* Grainger et al., 2018)
- Strategic monitoring (*e.g.* Mu, Rubin, and Zou, 2021)

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[1] Strategy and the CAA

[2] The problems of pollution transfer

- Tessum et al. (2017)
- Sergi et al. (2020)
- Wang et al. (2020)

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[1] Strategy and the CAA

[2] The problems of pollution transfer

[3] The pollution-haven hypothesis

- Cole (2004)
- Levinson (2008)
- Millimet and Roy (2015)
- (Among many others)

The Geography of Power Plants

Data Sources

Generator Data:

- EPA **CAMD** (Clean Air Markets Division) 
- EPA **eGRID** (Emissions & Generation Integrated Database)

Geography:


- US Census Bureau **TIGER/Line** and **cartographic boundary** shapefiles for county, state, and water features
- EPA's **Greenbook NAYRO** for county non-attainment histories

Meteorology: NOAA's **NARR** (North American Regional Reanalysis)

- Historic wind patterns by pressure levels.
- 32km × 32km grid cells across contiguous US


Panel A: Distance to nearest **county** border

2018 operating/stand-by units, capacity ≥ 25 MW




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
Panel B: Distance to nearest **state** border

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


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
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Some borders have water (Oregon)



Some borders have water (South Carolina)



Testing for strategic siting

There are two (non-exclusive) reasons plants might site near borders:

1. **"non-strategic"** inputs to production and transportation (*e.g.*, water)
2. **strategic** exporting of emissions' (external) costs (regulatory avoidance)

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
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Question: Do coal-fired power plants use the ratio of upwind/downwind area within their own admin. unit to produce or transport electricity? (*Unlikely.*)



Strategic Siting: Identification

Main Idea: In the absence of strategy, it's a 50-50 flip whether the county's area **upwind** of the plant is larger or smaller than its **downwind** area.

- **Focus on coal-fueled plants**
Strongest incentive to avoid regulation and/or export emissions downwind
- **Placebo: Natural gas fueled plants**
Face much lower incentives to export/avoid

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Identifying assumption:

There are no non-strategic, latent features used by plants use in siting decisions that also correlate w/ the ratio of upwind and downwind areas.

- Social/political/physical processes don't typically use the ratio of upwind to downwind areas within a county or state. 🦆
- Nat. gas face many similar input/transmission constraints.
This latent feature would need to be important to coal & absent from gas.

Formalizing the test

Our test is implemented via a **Fisher's exact test**

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 - n_s : # plants for whom downwind area < upwind area
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 - + Convenient falsification test: Natural gas
 - Major drawback: cannot capture more nuanced strategy


Strategic Siting: Main Results

	County		State	
	Coal	Natural Gas	Coal	Natural Gas
Count	515	1,258	515	1,258
Count <i>strategic</i>	297	612	279	575
Percent <i>strategic</i>	57.67%	48.65%	54.17%	45.71%
Fisher's exact test of H_0 : downwind area \geq upwind area				
Under H_0 : $E[\text{Percent strategic}] = 50\%$				
P-value	0.0003	0.8381	0.0321	0.9989

The Geography of Coal Emissions


Overview

We quantify the nature of the pollution transfer problem using **HYSPLIT** 

- Particle trajectory model; heavily vetted by NOAA.
- Especially helpful for *long-distance* pollution transport modeling.
-  Coal EGU-based particles can travel long distances (*tall* stacks).

Overview


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
Using HYSPLIT, we can see **where particles departing coal plants travel**
... and find the **sources** of a region's coal-based emissions.

Example of HYSPLIT particle trajectories


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


Hours since release




Exporting emissions

Percent of emissions outside source **county** by hours since release



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
Percent of emissions outside source **state** by hours since release



Sources of local emissions

Panel A: Sources of local coal-based particles, weighted by mass of SO₂ emissions

Coal-fueled units in 2005 with capacity greater than 25 MW



Conclusions

We find

1. Many power plants in the US **sited near borders** (county and state).
2. **Coal plants strategically sited** to reduce downwind exposure.
Nat. gas plants did not.
3. Coal plants' pollution **quickly leaves origin counties and states**.

Implications

1. Geographic dispersion of inputs complicates decentralized regulations.
2. Regulated units have strategically responded (exporting emissions).
3. Transport-based regulations will be key to internalizing costs.

Thank you!

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